Six months into the war, there is no clear winner. The campaign that had begun with devastating strikes on Iran failed to produce the political result that Washington and its allies had intended, and Tehran was not able to get what it wanted. The war has deteriorated into a stalemate with both sides having leverage but little to see out of it.
The 60-day memorandum of understanding reached by Pakistan in June expired on August 17 without a successor agreement, formal ceasefire or scheduled negotiations. Trump has stressed that Iran isn’t rushing back to the negotiating table, while Tehran has denied that there is a backchannel. Iran’s foreign ministry has claimed the memorandum was limited to the nuclear issue while the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has denied that secret negotiations were taking place.
Neither side has achieved its main objective
For Washington, the primary objectives of the military campaign were to weaken Iran's leadership, to diminish its nuclear capabilities, and to put Tehran in a better negotiating position. But Iran’s political system has survived the initial shock of the war.
The killing of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in a joint US-Israeli attack on February 28 was expected to leave a leadership vacuum and to fracture the Iranian establishment. But the Iranian Assembly of Experts appointed Mojtaba Khamenei as the country's new supreme leader within days.
President Masoud Pezeshkian remains in office, and the Iranian parliament continues to function. Tehran has also maintained a hardline negotiating stance, refusing to return to talks while facing what Iranian officials describe as an economic strangulation campaign.
Iran, for its part, has not achieved its own goals. Sanctions are still on, access to frozen overseas assets has not been restored and the US naval blockade has not been lifted. The country's economy has also been hurt by the conflict and international restrictions.
Strait of Hormuz Remains Iran’s Biggest Card.
One of Tehran's most powerful vectors of leverage remains the Strait of Hormuz, a crucial global energy chokepoint through which a substantial share of the world's seaborne oil normally passes.
In March, the IRGC imposed restrictions on shipping linked to what it called unfriendly nations and claimed control over the waterway. The Strait has not become completely impassable and shipping activity is still far below pre-war levels but shipping activity has decreased significantly since then.
The disruption has had implications far beyond Iran and the Gulf. Lower oil flows, higher war-risk insurance premiums and regular attacks on commercial vessels have increased the price and risk for international shipping. The International Maritime Organization has also recorded hundreds of ship accidents and seafarers’ deaths for the campaign.
For Tehran, the ability to threaten shipping through Hormuz is a strong deterrent to more escalation. A major disruption could quickly push global energy prices higher, forcing U.S. and Gulf partners to rethink their strategy.
Iran's military reach has not disappeared.
The conflict has also shown that Iran is still able to strike US-linked targets and exert pressure across the region.
Iranian attacks during the early stages of the war targeted locations in several Gulf countries including Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain and the UAE. Iran-aligned groups are also active in other theatres.
Houthis have continued to disrupt shipping routes (and Iran-backed groups elsewhere in the region have joined the war). This has prevented the war from being limited to Iranian territory and increased the strategic and economic costs for the US and its regional partners.
Nuclear Uncertainty complicates the conflict
Probably the most difficult issue facing Washington is Iran's nuclear programme.
The International Atomic Energy Agency has been unable to conduct normal on-site inspections of Iran’s damaged enrichment facilities. As a result, the international community remains unclear about what survived the strikes and what Iran might still have.
Iran's previous stockpile of uranium enriched to 60% was already a major concern for Western governments. Tehran has also raised the possibility of reconsidering its participation in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Such a move would take away an important element of international oversight and could trigger a major escalation. At the same time, there is a lack of verification because the international powers have no way to assess exactly how much Iran’s nuclear infrastructure and material is intact.
The sanctions are hurting Tehran, but slowly
But Washington is increasingly moving away from direct military pressure and into economic warfare.
The latest US sanctions campaign announced on August 24 targeted dozens of individuals, companies and vessels in shipping, technology, aviation, gold and digital assets. The administration has described the strategy as an effort to intensify economic pressure on Tehran.
Iran has already undergone severe economic problems before this escalation. Inflation, currency depreciation and low economic activity have put huge pressure on ordinary people.
But sanctions alone have historically been unable to force rapid political change. Iran has developed a long-term strategy to get around such restrictions and maintain trade through other channels. So the economic pressure is not a short-term approach to regime change but rather a long-term strategy, and that is at the heart of this.
US weapons stocks are under pressure
The shift toward sanctions has also come when questions about the sustainability of America’s missile-defense capabilities are emerging.
Analysts have estimated significant reductions in US stocks of Patriot and THAAD interceptors due to the intense demands of the fight. Replacing them could take years, and if another long-term battle breaks out Washington will be in a position of strategic constraint.
The problem has caused some disagreement within the US, with officials disputing some of the estimates and worries about depleted inventories. But the bigger issue is that sustained high-intensity warfare consumes sophisticated weapons and interceptors much faster than they can be replaced.
Regional Powers avoid taking sides
West Asian countries have also been forced to navigate a difficult diplomatic balance.
The UAE has suspended trade and financial transactions with Iran and Qatar has maintained diplomatic channels. Oman has also played a role in efforts surrounding the Strait of Hormuz.
In a new pact of cooperation, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan have strengthened their defence cooperation but this is not a NATO-like alliance with an automatic mutual defence commitment.
Despite being attacked in the war, several Arab states have stopped short of joining an anti-Iran coalition. They appear to be most concerned about preventing the war from becoming a wider regional disaster.
What Happens next?
Three developments could have a major impact on the course of the conflict. A decision by Washington to ban a major Chinese bank to pressure Tehran would dramatically increase the economic pressure. Iran formally leaving the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty would remove a crucial verification mechanism and potentially accelerate the nuclear crisis.
The third major trigger could come from the energy market. A serious tanker incident or a sustained disruption in the Strait of Hormuz could push oil prices sharply higher, forcing Washington and Gulf states to choose between further escalation and renewed accommodation. So far neither side can claim victory. Iran has survived the military campaign, and it has some important strategic cards, especially its ability to control shipping and regional security. Meanwhile the United States has a huge military and economic advantage but has yet to find a political solution.
Six months into the conflict, the key question is no longer who won the war. It is whether either side can convert its remaining leverage into an agreement before another escalation pushes West Asia into an even wider and more dangerous conflict.
